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OIL AND GAS LAW:
WHEN IT COMES TO RESTRICTIVE
EMPLOYMENT COVENANTS, WHOSE IDEA OF
"REASONABLE" IS CORRECT,
THE OIL COMPANY'S OR THE LANDMAN'S?
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting confidential information and other intellectual property is
vital to gaining an edge on the competition, because finding the oil before
your competitor is crucial to staying in business. The easiest way an oil
company can protect its interests and keep former employees from
exploiting those interests is to put a non-competition clause in the contract
for employment.' The oil company may also make the employee sign a
confidentiality agreement or a covenant not to compete when the employ-
ment is terminated. 2 However, the employee must be allowed to make a
living and cannot be precluded from practicing his or her trade forever by
his former employer.3 And so the argument begins between the oil com-
pany and employee. How long is the employee precluded from working for
the oil company's competitor? How long is the covenant not to compete
enforceable? What is the reasonable amount of time allowed for non-
competition?
This note focuses on covenants not to compete, protection of
confidential information, and the reasonable amount of time between the
termination of employment and future competition. It will discuss actions
the oil company can take to protect its interests, and the actions the
employee can take to continue practicing his profession. This note takes
into account North Dakota statutes and case law, as well as statutes and case
law from other oil-producing states and federal circuits. There is very little
case law in North Dakota that directly deals with these issues. Because of
1. See Elizabeth Williams, J.D., Cause of Action to Enforce Anticompetition Covenant in
Employment Contract, 11 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 375, 386 (1998) (stating restrictive covenants
frequently include language to govern an employee's conduct at the termination of the relation-
ship). Covenants not to compete, which restrain anyone from lawfully practicing a profession,
trade, or business are void. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2003). There are statutory and court-
created exceptions, which will be discussed at length in this note.
2. Lynn P. Hendrix, Covenants Not to Compete and Confidentiality Agreements in the
Natural Resources Industry, 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21-4, 21-33 (Appendix B) (1992);
Appendix A infra.
3. Williams, supra note 1, at 410.
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this, oil companies and employees in North Dakota must make creative
arguments and look to other jurisdictions to support their actions.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
The simplest way to lay out the problem facing oil companies and their
employees is to begin with a hypothetical situation. The following
scenario, with some variation, has undoubtedly occurred a number of times
in western North Dakota.
Anderson has worked in the oil and gas business for the past twenty
years. His last job was with the Big Oil Company securing leases in
western North Dakota, specifically McKenzie County. While Anderson
worked for Big Oil, he had access to all of their documents, including maps,
which showed where Big Oil sought to drill and lease agreements with
landowners. Unfortunately for Anderson and Big Oil, the need to drill for
oil in western North Dakota decreased and Big Oil was forced to let
Anderson go.
Anderson, undeterred by the western North Dakota oil market, decided
to go into business for himself. He started Anderson Land Company in
McKenzie County and campaigned to secure oil and gas leases from local
landowners. Anderson, being well-trained in his field, knew that he could
not immediately compete with Big Oil, so he waited six months before he
began to secure leases for himself. After the six months passed, Anderson
knew exactly where to start. He made maps of Big Oil's acquisitions while
working for Big Oil and knew where most of the local oil companies were
looking to acquire leases. Anderson remembered most of the names of the
landowners from whom Big Oil was seeking to acquire leases. He worked
diligently reviewing titles and abstracts in the county courthouse to find any
open tracts.
Big Oil soon learned of what Anderson was doing and immediately
filed suit for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, and misappropri-
ation of trade secrets. Big Oil claims that Anderson used Big Oil's confi-
dential information when he was not so privileged. Anderson claims that he
has the right to use whatever information he acquired while working for Big
Oil because he waited a reasonable amount of time, in this case six months,
before he began competing with Big Oil.
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OIL COMPANY AND THE
LANDMAN
Anderson, the employee from the hypothetical situation, is known as a
landman. 4 A landman is an employee of an oil company.5 The landman's
primary responsibility is managing the oil company's relations with the
landowners. 6 He or she works with the landowners to secure oil and gas
leases, lease amendments, pooling and unitization agreements, and instru-
ments necessary for curing title defects. 7 He must check courthouse
records, cure land titles and negotiate easements for each well drilled. 8 The
landman must also manage thousands of acres of previously leased land for
each well drilled.9 Needless to say, the landman's job is very demanding.
Most of the landman's legal and ethical duties and obligations to the oil
company and landowners are clear.' 0 He is an agent of his employer and a
fiduciary within the scope of his agency." The employer expects the
landman to exercise good faith, loyalty, and honesty toward the employer.
12
The landman cannot be in competition with his employer, and he cannot
personally benefit from any confidential information he acquires while un-
der his employment.13
The common practices in the oil and gas industry have the potential for
a large amount of conflicts.14 The research and discovery procedure in-
volved in finding an oil or gas field includes many people in the overall
operation.' 5 Those looking for oil expose their secrets and plans to more
people in different occupations than any other industry.16 Other problems
arise because of the fixed nature of the industry.17 Landmen become
4. JAMES C. HOSKINS, II, THE PETROLEUM LANDMAN: BASIC PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
5 (Peggy J. Durham ed., lED Press, Inc. 1983). This term is often interchangeable with "land-
person" or "leasehound." Id.
5. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 562
(Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., Lexis 11 th ed. 2000).
6. Id. at 562.
7. Id.
8. Hoskins, supra note 4, at 2.
9. Id.
10. Rodney D. Knutson, Legal and Ethical Obligations a Landman Owes His Employer, 31
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19-1, 19-3 (1985).
11. id.
12. Id. at 19-3 to 19-4.
13. Id. at 19-4.
14. Id. at 19-4. See also Frank H. Morison, Conflicts of Interest in the Oil and Gas Industry,
8 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 219 (1963) (explaining the duties of the many different people in
the oil and gas industry and their exposure to controversy).
15. Morison, supra note 14, at 219.
16. Id. at 220.
17. Id.
20051
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experts in one geographic area and have a desire to remain where their
skills are highly developed.18 As a result, work projects overlap and bring
conflicts of interest between the landman and former employers.19 Perhaps
one of the most important practice problems is the increase in technology,
allowing companies to turn pasture land into a multimillion-dollar oil
field.20
But what happens when a situation arises when the landman finds
himself in competition with the oil company? Or worse yet for the land-
man, he does not know that he is in competition with his former employer.
The landman may believe he is justified in the actions he took, and years of
experience and practicing common industry standards guided the landman
to act as he did, as Anderson was convinced. After relying on those years
of experience and common practices the landman finds himself being sued
by his former employer. The purpose of this article is to clarify any con-
fusion either party may have as to who, if anyone, is correct and point them
to helpful law.
IV. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
One of the two most common ways an oil company can protect its
information from a former landman or employee is with a covenant not to
compete. 21 A covenant not to compete is an agreement between the em-
ployer and employee not to compete in a trade or business. 22 North Dakota
has codified the use of covenants not to compete,23 as have other states in
the Rocky Mountain region and elsewhere. 24 Covenants not to compete,
after the termination of employment, are usually enforceable if they are
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. This concept is especially important in western North Dakota, where the advent of
horizontal drilling has impacted production allowing many oil companies to reach new oil fields.
Gary S. Swindell, Horizontal Drilling-What Have We Found?, http://oil.server4.com/
horizogj.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
21. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-1, 21-4. The other common form of protecting information
is a confidentiality agreement, where the employee agrees not to discuss or disclose any pertinent
material that the employee learns while working for his employer. Ted M. Anthony, Intellectual
Property: What it is and Why it is Important to Land Professionals, THE LANDMAN, July/August
2002, at 45.
22. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-7.
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2003).
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-
113(2) (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to 28-2-
705 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (West 1993); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
15.05(a), 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 53-9-8 to 53-9-10 (2004).
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reasonable under the circumstances.2 5 Covenants not to compete must be
ancillary to a lawful contract and must comply with specific state statutes.
2 6
A. NORTH DAKOTA'S APPLICATION OF COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE
Covenants not to compete and the restraint of business in North Dakota
are governed by statute, which provides that any contract that restrains a
party from "exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is
to that extent void." 27 Two exceptions may apply: (1) the seller of the
goodwill of the business and the buyer may agree that the buyer will not
carry on a similar line of business within a specified county or city; 28 and
(2) the partners in the dissolution of a partnership may agree that any
number of the parties will not carry on a business similar to that of the
partnership in the same city or any specified area of the same city. 29 These
two exceptions do not directly relate to the problem posed in the hypo-
thetical situation or in other landman situations, but addressing them helps
in understanding where the legislature and the courts have been with
regards to non-competition clauses.
The intention of North Dakota Century Code Section 9-08-06 is to
promote commercial activity. 30 Contracting for future employment is an
essential part of "one's ability to exercise a lawful profession, trade, or
business." 3' Section 9-08-06 protects an employee's ability to negotiate
and contract for future employment while that employee is under a contract
which restricts such negotiations. 32
The North Dakota Supreme Court has consistently limited the extent of
covenants not to compete. 33 In Olson v. Swendiman,34 the Court noted that
a departing dentist, who worked in an office with the defendant (also a
dentist) would take with him a great many of the defendant's patrons,
25. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-10.
26. Id. at 21-12.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2003).
28. Id. § 9-08-06(1).
29. Id. § 9-08-06(2).
30. Herman v. Newman Signs, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1987).
31. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc. v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Center, 479 N.W.2d
848,851 (N.D. 1992).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Herman v. Newman Signs, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1987) (stating that a
non-competition clause that covered more than one county was unenforceable); Igoe v. Atlas
Ready-Mix, Inc., 134 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1965) (stating that a promise not to compete with a
former employer within the same county was valid in the county of the principle place of business,
but not in other counties).
34. 244 N.W. 870 (N.D. 1932).
NOTE
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would seriously injure the defendant's business, and therefore, it seemed
right that the defendant ought to be able to contract for his protection. 35
The Court in Olson relied on United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,36
which held covenants that partially restrain trade are valid when they are
"by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his master or em-
ployer after the expiration of his time of service." 37 The Olson Court found
that covenants not to compete are allowed if the employer is trying to
restrain the employee from further competing. 38
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also held that employees may
negotiate for future employment while under a contract, even though that
contract may seek to prohibit such activity. 39 However, the Court did not
go so far as to say that employees are free from any duties owed their em-
ployer.40 Although the courts will allow covenants not to compete, they
will not allow employers the absolute ability to restrict an employee's
opportunity to negotiate for future employment. 41
The geographic area restricted by the covenant not to compete must be
large enough to protect the employer's interest, but not larger than neces-
sary.4 2 The Court has been specific about the geography of where an em-
ployee can work after leaving his employer.43 In Herman v. Newman Signs,
Inc.44 the Court distinguished the geographic restriction of a covenant not to
compete.4 5 Herman's principle place of business was Burleigh County,
specifically the City of Bismarck.4 6 Newman, who bought a portion of
Herman's business, erected billboards and other appurtenants in Morton
County, specifically in the City of Mandan. 47 The Court held that the
covenant not to compete between the parties was void to the extent that it
35. Olson. 244 N.W. at 871.
36. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), rev'd 78 F. 712 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1897), affd as modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
37. Olson, 244 N.W. at 871 (citing Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 281).
38. Id.
39. See Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc. v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 479 N.W.2d
848, 851 (N.D. 1992) (holding that N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 does not prohibit such activity).
40. Id. at 853. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02 (outlining the obligations of an
employer-employee relationship).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06.
42. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-13.
43. See, e.g., Herman v. Newman Signs, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D. 1987) (stating that
a non-competition clause that covered more than one county was unenforceable).
44. 417 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1987).
45. Herman, 417 N.W.2d at 180.
46. Id.
47. Id. For those not familiar with North Dakota geography, Bismarck and Mandan are sister
cities separated by the Missouri River in south central North Dakota. THE ROAD ATLAS 77 (Rand
McNally & Co. 2003).
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restricted business in more than one county. 48 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has been very consistent with this holding, allowing a covenant not to
compete only where the buyer and seller of goodwill are located in the same
county.49
If the court finds that a covenant not to compete is too broad, it may
nonetheless enforce the non-competition clause in the county where the em-
ployer has its principal business. 50 In Hawkins Chemical Inc. v. McNea,51
the restricting party realized that the non-competition clause was too broad
in its geographic scope, but insisted that the Court still enforce the clause in
Ward County. 52 The Court obliged, stating a non-competition clause that
included more territory than allowed by law was still valid in the county in
which the business was located. 53 The Court relied on a California case,
which provided:
If such a contract is indefinite as to time or territory the court will
construe it in such manner as to make it valid. If the contract is
unrestricted as to the territory in which the seller agreed to refrain
from competition with the purchaser of his business, or if it
includes more territory than that provided by law it will be
construed to be operative within the county or portion thereof in
which the business is located.5 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court has continually held that non-competition
clauses are valid only in the county of the principle business.55 Section 9-
48. See Herman, 471 N.W.2d at 180-81. (citing Igoe v. Atlas Ready-Mix, Inc., 134 N.W.2d
511, 519 (N.D. 1965) (holding that a covenant not to compete was enforceable in Bismarck but
not in Mandan).
49. See, e.g., Atlas Ready-Mix of Minot v. White Props., Inc., 306 N.W.2d 212, 223 (N.D.
1981) (holding the covenant not to compete was valid and that defendants had violated that
covenant not to compete). The North Dakota Supreme Court looked at a covenant not to compete
for a period of five years between Atlas and White Properties, Minot Paving Company, and Steve
and Thomas McCormick. Id. at 215. Both the plaintiff and the defendants were engaged in the
sand and gravel retail business in Ward County and the covenant not to compete dealt specifically
with Ward County. Id. The court held the covenant not to compete was valid and that the defen-
dants violated that covenant not to compete. Id. at 217-18.
50. Hawkins Chem., Inc. v. McNea, 321 N.W.2d 918, 918 (N.D. 1982).
51. 321 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1982).
52. Hawkins, 321 N.W.2d at 920.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 180 P.2d 777, 779 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1947))
(emphasis in original).
55. Hawkins, 321 N.W.2d at 918; Herman v. Newman Signs, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 179, 181
(N.D. 1987). See also Earthworks, Inc. v. Sehn, 553 N.W.2d 490, 494 (N.D. 1996) (holding a
non-competition agreement which included the "state of North Dakota" was invalid); Werlinger v.
Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 26, 29-30 (N.D. 1993) (holding a non-competition
agreement that said plaintiff could not compete within twenty-five miles of defendant held invalid
because it covered more than one county).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
08-06 of the Century Code "represents one of the oldest and most
continuous applications of public policy in contract law, and it invalidates
provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working
for a competitor after completion of his employment." 56
B. OTHER STATES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION AND
ELSEWHERE
Other states in the Rocky Mountain Region57 have specific statutes
governing covenants not to compete that are similar to North Dakota's.5 8
For example, Colorado's statute provides that any covenant not to compete
that restricts the right of any person to practice their trade or skill is void,
except if it applies to a contract for the sale of a business, the protection of a
trade secret, recovering expenses for training an employee, and executives
who constitute management personnel.59 In Montana, contracts that restrain
a person from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or any other business
are void, except in the sale of goodwill of a business or in the dissolution of
a partnership. 60 South Dakota has statutes similar to that of Montana. 6' In
addition, South Dakota also has a statute that deals directly with covenants
not to compete in employment contracts, and provides:
An employee may agree with an employer at the time of
employment or at any time during his employment not to engage
directly or indirectly in the same business or profession as that of
his employer for any period not exceeding two years from the date
of termination of the agreement and not to solicit existing cus-
tomers of the employer within a specified county, first or second
class municipality, or other specified area for any period not
exceeding two years from the date of termination of the agreement,
if the employer continues to carry on a like business therein. 62
What distinguishes the South Dakota statute from North Dakota's statutes
or case law is that South Dakota specifies a time period for how long the
56. Earthworks, 553 N.W.2d at 493 (citations omitted).
57. See Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-6 n.8 (listing the Rocky Mountain Region states as:
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming).
58. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-
113(2) (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to 28-2-
705 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (West 1993); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
15.05(a), 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 53-9-8 to 53-9-10 (Michie 2004).
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2).
60. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to 28-2-705 (2003).
61. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 53-9-8 to 53-9-10 (Michie 2004).
62. Id. § 53-9-11.
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non-competition clause is effective. 63 Since North Dakota does not make
this specification, employers and employees must guess. Thus, the cove-
nant must be long enough to protect the employer's legitimate interest, but
no longer than necessary.64
There are several other oil-producing states that have statutes dealing
directly with covenants not to compete, including California,65 Louisiana,66
Oklahoma, 67 and Texas. 68 Louisiana, like South Dakota, specifies that a
non-competition clause may not last more than two years. 69 Oklahoma also
has a statute dealing directly with non-competition agreements.7 0 However,
unlike the South Dakota and Louisiana statutes, the Oklahoma statute does
not specify a time period.71
V. IMPLIED CONTRACTS: THE SOURCE OF CONFUSION
Many contracts made by landmen are oral contracts with a promise to
perform. 72 These oral contracts are perfectly legal, 73 and are the standard
practice in the oil and gas industry. 74 Because there is often no formal
contract process, the employer and employee may have different opinions
as to what the non-competition period may be.75
63. Compare id. (stating the non-competition period lasts two years) with N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 9-08-06 (specifying no exact time for a non-competition period).
64. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-13.
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602 (West 1997).
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (1998).
67. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219 (West 1993).
68. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.05(a), 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002).
69. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921(G)(1).
70. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219A. Section 219A provides:
(A) A person who makes an agreement with an employer, whether in writing or
verbally, not to compete with the employer after the employment relationship has been
terminated, shall be permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by the
former employer or in a similar business as that conducted by the former employer as
long as the former employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a
combination of goods and services from the established customers of the former
employer.
(B) Any provision in a contract between an employer and an employee in conflict with
the provisions of this section shall be void and unenforceable.
Id.
71. Id.
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-01 (2003). "An implied contract is one the existence and terms
of which are manifested by conduct." Id. See also Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-26 (stating
smaller oil companies often use oral agreements when hiring landmen).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-02. "All contracts may be oral except such as are specially
required by statute to be in writing." Id. For contracts that must be in writing, consult Id. § 9-06-
04.
74. Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-25.
75. Id. at 19-27.
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When the landman leaves his employment, he may be presented with
another opportunity to do title searches for another employer located in the
same area as the previous employer. So how long should the landman wait
to compete? If the contract was oral, the parties' intentions may be difficult
to determine; the courts are then left to determine a "reasonable" time
limit.76 Confusion and litigation seem to be the result if the employer and
landman fail to specifically determine what constitutes a reasonable time. 77
The length of a "reasonable" time differs between North Dakota and other
Rocky Mountain Region states.
A. REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME IN NORTH DAKOTA
In the oil and gas industry, the established period during which a
landman is barred from working in a specified area can be anywhere from
three months to three years, but it is most often between six months and one
year.78 Where uncertainty in a contract arises, the language of the contract
should be construed against the party who caused the uncertainty. 79 Al-
though there is no written language for the courts to look at with an oral
contract, "[a] contract includes not only what the parties say, but also what
is necessary to be implied from what they say." 80 In North Dakota, if the
parties fail to specify a time for performance, a reasonable time will be
allowed by law. 81 What determines a reasonable amount of time may be a
question of fact depending on the actions of the parties involved.82
The North Dakota Supreme Court has yet to determine how long an
implied contract is enforceable. Statutory language allows a reasonable
amount of time, 83 but the court's job is to interpret the statute for clarifi-
cation. In Braithwaite v. Power,84 a ship owner was contracted to carry
goods from Bismarck, North Dakota to Fort Buford, South Dakota via the
76. See Williams, supra note 1, at 446-47 (stating that time restrictions of non-competition
agreements are reasonable anywhere from ninety days to ten years); see also Knutson, supra note
10, at 19-26 (stating that time restrictions in the oil and gas industry are generally between three
months and three years).
77. See generally Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-28 (providing a procedure to help limit
confusion in such situations).
78. Id. at 19-26.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (2003).
80. Mace v. Cole, 198 N.W. 816, 818 (1924) (citing Grossman v. Schenker, 100 N.E. 39, 40
(N.Y. 1912), affg 128 N.Y.S. 1125 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1911)).
81. Huber v. Oliver County, 529 N.W.2d 179, 182 (N.D. 1995), on subsequent appeal 1999
ND 220, 602 N.W.2d 710, reh'g denied, (2000). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-22 (stating if
no time is specified for performance, a reasonable time is allowed).
82. Huber, 529 N.W.2d at 182 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Belfield v. Burich, 367 N.W.2d
148, 154 (N.D. 1985)).
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-22.
84. 48 N.W. 354 (1891).
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Missouri River at the onset of winter. 85 The ship owner could not perform
immediately as the river froze up due to cold winter temperatures.8 6 No
time of delivery was set out in the contract between the parties. 87 The Court
found that the time of delivery was reasonable, given the time of year for
performance, even though it occurred months after what the parties believed
would be the delivery date. 88
Another case where the Court had an opportunity to define a
"reasonable" time but did not is Huber v. Oliver County.89 In this case, a
landowner provided Oliver County with an easement across the
landowner's property to construct a road.90 The county was to build two
separate crossings over a creek, but the culverts installed by the county
proved to be unsatisfactory. 91 The county tried several more times to reme-
dy the situation over the next nineteen years but was unsuccessful and
subsequently gave up trying to redirect the creek. 92 One of the issues pre-
sented in front of the North Dakota Supreme Court was the failure of the
contract to establish a time limit within which the county was to perform. 93
Because this issue rested on when the statute of limitations expired, the
Court had to determine what a reasonable time for performance would be,
which it could not.94 No undisputed facts existed for the court to determine
when the statute of limitations began to run; therefore, there was no way for
the Court to determine what amounted to a reasonable time for
performance. 9
5
B. REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other jurisdictions in the Eighth Circuit and the Rocky Mountain
Region have made findings similar to the North Dakota courts.96 Montana
85. Braithwaite, 48 N.W. at 355.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 355-56.
88. Id. at 357.
89. 529 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1995).
90. Huber, 529 N.W.2d at 181.
91. Id. The culverts were unsatisfactory because they washed away after the first spring
thaw of the year following their construction. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 182.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Retail Associates, Inc. v. Macy's East, Inc., 245 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that in the absence of express terms, the duration of a contract may be construed by the
parties' intent); Woodruff v. New State Ice Co., 197 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir. 1952) (holding an
implied contract may be construed based on the actions of the parties); Gould v. Rite-Way Oil &
Inv. Co., 351 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo. 1960) (holding that a reasonable time to perform is presumed if
the contract does not fix a time for performance); McFarland v. Joint School Dist. No. 365 in
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and South Dakota have statutes almost identical to North Dakota Century
Code Section 9-07-22.97 However, the situation remains that neither the
statutory language nor case law help determine what is reasonable in
regards to a reasonable time not to compete.
VI. INFORMATION THAT DESERVES PROTECTION
When a landman is employed by an oil company it is expected that the
information the landman acquires while working for the oil company is
confidential. 98 Some information an employer may wish to keep confiden-
tial could be considered trade secrets. 99 Trade secrets are protected from
use by an unprivileged party by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.100 Trade
secrets are different from confidential information and are therefore given
different protection.01 A landman can never use information that is secret
or that was obtained in a deceitful or dishonest way to the disadvantage of
his former employer. 1
02
A. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
1. Information That is Protected
A trade secret, as defined by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that:
Elmore and Owyhee Counties, 700 P.2d 141, 143-44 (Id. App. 1985) (holding that the law
presumes a reasonable time for performance if one is not specified); Dambrowski v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 76 P.3d 1080, 1082 (Mont. 2003), reh'g denied, 3 P.3d 617 (Mont. 2000) (holding that
"reasonable time" is what is necessary to properly perform the contract); Soper by and through
Soper v. Means, 903 P.2d 222, 224 (Nev. 1995) (holding that a reasonable time for performance
of a contract is determined by the circumstances involved); Western Commerce Bank v. Gillespie,
775 P.2d 737, 739 (N.M. 1989) (holding that conditions precedent to formation of a contract are
controlled by the intent of the parties); Texas County Mem'l Found., Inc. v. Ramsey, 677 P.2d
665, 667 (Oki. App. 1984) (holding that if a contract does not fix terms, the contract's life may be
terminated by either party at any time); Ramesbotham v. Farmers Elevator Co. of Jefferson, 428
N.W.2d 542, 544 (S.D. 1988) (holding that where time for performance is not an element of the
contract, the contract must be performed within a reasonable time); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Benchmark Electronics, Inc., 142 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Tex. App. 2004), petition for review filed
(October 4, 2004) (holding that a contract that can be interpreted in more than one reasonable way
is deemed ambiguous); Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., Inc., 18 P.3d 645, 657 (Wyo.
2001) (holding that where no time for performance is specified in the contract, a reasonable time,
which depends on the circumstances, must be allowed for performance).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-601 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-10-2 (Michie 2004).
98. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768, 770 (10th Cir. 1982).
99. Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-20.
100. Anthony, supra note 21, at 42-43.
101. Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-19 to 19-20.
102. Id. at 19-21.
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(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 103
Trade secrets can include unleased prospect acreage, geological maps,
seismic and other data, and cash flow projections. 104 To protect trade
secrets, North Dakota has adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act.105 Forty-two other states and the District of Columbia have a similar
provision of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in their statues.1 06
2. Information That is Not Protected
Not everything learned on the job is a trade secret. 107 What may be the
most important factor in determining a trade secret is "whether the informa-
tion is readily accessible to a reasonably diligent competitor."108 The
employee who leaves has a right to take all the skill he acquired and all the
103. Warner and Co. v. Solberg, 2001 ND 156, T 30, 634 N.W.2d 65, 74.
104. Anthony, supra note 21, at 45. This list is not meant to be exhaustive.
105. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-08 (2003).
106. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-18 n.42 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (Michie 2002);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.940 to .945 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to -407
(West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (Michie 2001); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3426 to
3426.10 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§
36-401 to 36-410 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001 to .009 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. §§
10-1-760 to 10-1-767 (Michie 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to B-9 (1993); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 48-801 to -807 (Michie 2003); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1-9 (West 2001); IND.
CODEANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (Michie 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1 to .8 (West 1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880 to .900 (Michie
2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to :1439 (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§
1541-1548 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 1I §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1901 to .1910 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01 to C.08
(West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450 to .467
(West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to 87-
507 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 600A.010 to A.100 (Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
350-B:1 to B:9 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to A-7 (Michie 2004); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1333.61 to .69 (Anderson 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78 §§ 85 to 94 (West 2002); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 646.461 to .475 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-8-1 to 39-8-130 (West Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (Michie 2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1701 to -1709 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (2001);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4601-4609 (Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Michie
2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010 to .940 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-
22-1 to -10 (Michie 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 2001)).
107. See Knutson, supra note 10, 19-20.
108. Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir. 1980).
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information and knowledge he learned.109 However, that employee cannot
take anything that is the property of the employer."l0 Property of the em-
ployer includes trade secrets and cannot be taken or used by the employee
for his own benefit.III These trade secrets may include any customer lists
of the employer.ll 2 As one scholar noted, "[g]iven the importance of
information exchange, if the law allowed companies to preclude the un-
authorized transfer or dissemination of all useful data and knowledge
ostensibly 'owned' by [the employer], other commercial actors would be
prevented from adapting or improving upon even basic techniques."" 
3
Employees who left their employers would not even be allowed to take the
most basic knowledge from one position to the next. 14
B. CLASSIFYING TRADE SECRETS
1. What is Considered a Trade Secret?
In order for an employer to classify any information relating to oil and
gas research as a trade secret in North Dakota, the employer must submit
the information to the Oil and Gas Research Council.115 The council is
designed to demonstrate the importance of oil and gas exploration, to en-
courage and promote efficient energy use, to promote safe exploration and
production methods, to develop oil and gas resources, and to support oil and
gas research and education."16 Upon submission, the employer must
request that the council determine the information received to be a trade
secret or other proprietary information and should not be classified as a
public record. " 7 The request must contain:
(a) A general description of the nature of the information sought to
be protected.
109. Pratt v. Shell Oil Corp., 100 F.2d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 1938) (citing Garst v. Scott, 270 P.




113. Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap: Protecting "Confidential
Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 849 (1998).
114. Id. at 850.
115. See N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 54-17.6-06 (2003) (providing that the Oil and Gas Research
Council was created because of the important information used in the oil and gas industry and to
promote sound methods of exploration).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 54-17.6-06.
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(b) An explanation of why the information derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to other persons.
(c) An explanation of why the information is not readily
ascertainable by proper means by other persons.
(d) A general description of any person or entity that may obtain
economic value from disclosure or use of the information, and
how the person or entity may obtain this value.
(e) A description of the efforts used to maintain the secrecy of the
information. 118
The council examines the information and determines if that information
falls under the trade secret definition.'19 If the council determines the infor-
mation qualifies as a trade secret, that information does not become public
record.120 However, if the council determines that the information is not a
trade secret the council shall notify the entity who may then ask for a return
of the information.l2 1 If the entity does not seek return of the information,
it and the request become public record.1
22
2. What is Considered Confidential Information?
Confidential commercial information has been classified into three
different categories:123 (1) information known to almost everyone in the
particular field; (2) information known to a majority of persons in a
particular field, but unknown to the minority; and, (3) information known to
a minority of persons in a particular field, but unknown to the majority.124
Because the first category of information is known to almost everyone,
there is little incentive for employers to protect that information from their
competitors.125 The third category of information is known only to a select
few, and the law is willing to afford this information legal protection
because it promotes and encourages innovation without stifling
competition. 126
118. Id. § 54-17.6-06(2).
119. Id. § 54-17.6-06(3); Id. Ch. 47-25.1.
120. Id. § 54-17.6-06(1).
121. Id. § 54-17.06-06(3).
122. Id. See also id. § 44-04-17.1(15) (defining a "record"); id. § 44-04-18 (providing for
access to public records); id. § 44-04-18.4 (providing for confidentiality of trade secrets,
proprietary, commercial, and financial information); id. § 44-04-18,10 (providing for disclosure of
public records by a public entity).
123. Unikel, supra note 113, at 844.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 850.
126. Id. at 852.
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Where most employers and employees experience difficulties, and
where the law is not clear, is in regards to the second category of infor-
mation.127 Information that is "not generally known" is afforded protection
by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the First Restatement of Torts, and the
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition. 128 Confidential information may
be defined as information unique to a company that does not need to be
shared in a particular field and is treated as confidential by its owner. 29
The policies underlying trade secret law do not require absolute secrecy of
the information, but rather relative secrecy. 130
Those that wish to protect their trade secret may rely on the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.131 However, information that is confidential, as opposed
to a trade secret, is not afforded the same protection. 32 This confidential
information is known by a majority of persons in the field, but not all those
in the field. 133 Allowing employers to restrict the transfer of this infor-
mation by a former employee to another employer who does not know of
this information would not unfairly restrict the marketability of the em-
ployee.134 Giving this confidential information some measure of protection
"is necessary to strike a balance between information owners' interests in
maintaining their commercial advantages, employees' interests in
127. Id. at 868.
128. Id. at 868-69. The First Restatement of Torts provides a definition for trade secrets. "A
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition provides that a trade secret is "any information that can
be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
129. Unikel, supra note 113, at 877-79. "Confidential information" should be defined as:
(1) Information that is novel as to an individual or company that:
(a) seeks to acquire and/or use, or has acquired and/or used, the information; and
(b) that could obtain, or has obtained, economic or competitive value from the
information's acquisition and/or use;
(2) Information that is not necessary for entry or participation in the relevant field,
industry or practice; and
(3) Information that is treated as confidential by its owner.
Id.
130. Id. at n.153 (citing Stephen J. Davidson & Robert L. DeMay, Application of Trade
Secret Law to New Technology- Unwinding the Tangled Web, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 579,
606 (1986); 1 Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets §§ 1.04, 1.05 (1997)).
131. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 47-25.1 (2003).
132. See id. § 47-25.1-01 (providing a definition of trade secrets, but not defining
confidential information).
133. Unikel, supra note 113, at 853-54.
134. Id. at 853.
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unrestricted movement between positions, and society's interests in pre-
serving commercial morality and promoting innovation."1 35
VII. REMEDIES
Employers may seek a number of remedies from the courts to prevent
any unjust enrichment from the use of their trade secrets. Some effective
causes of action and remedies include unfair competition, constructive
trusts, and interference with prospective business advantage. 136
Length of employment and compensation for employment have little to
do with the duties owed by the employee to the employer.137 No matter
how long the employee worked for the employer, even if only for a month,
the employee is not free to use confidential information which arose out of
the principal-agent relationship for his own private gain and to the detri-
ment of his employer.138 The employee may not put himself in a position in
which his personal interest may conflict with the duty to his principal.139
Actions taken by the employee to put his own interests before that of his
employer are not only morally wrong, but also contrary to public policy. 140
A. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Unfair competition is the taking of the employer's trade secret by the
employee or former employee and using that trade secret to compete against
the employer.14' In Conesco Finance Servicing Corp. v. North American
Mortgage Corp.,142 the Eighth Circuit held that in order for an employer to
recover for unfair competition, the employer must show three things.43
First, the employer must prove the existence of a trade secret.144 Second,
the employer must show that the trade secret was revealed to another party
by the employee while the employee was in a position of confidence and
135. Id. at 854.
136. See, e.g., Conesco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortgage Corp., 381 F.3d 811, 818
(8th Cir. 2004) reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (holding that the employer must show three things
in order to recover for unfair competition); Spagnolia v. Monasky, 2003 ND 65, 515, 660 N.W.2d
223, 229 reh'g denied (holding that a constructive trust is a remedy intended to restore proper
ownership to the rightful owner); Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND
116, T43, 628 N.W.2d 707, 721 (holding that interference with prospective business advantage
may either be done wrongfully or negligently).
137. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Willis, 152 F.2d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 1946).
138. Id.
139. Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1952).
140. Id.
141. Unikel, supra note 113, at 863.
142. 381 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2004).
143. Conesco, 381 F.3d at 818.
144. Id.
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trust with the employer.145 Third, the employer must show that the use of
the trade secret by another party damaged the employer.146 In this case the
court followed the Missouri statute defining a "trade secret," to which
North Dakota has a similar statute. 147
B. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
One remedy an employer may seek from the courts is a constructive
trust, which is "an equitable remedy to compel a person who unfairly holds
a property interest to convey it to the rightful owner." 148 The two elements
of a constructive trust are unjust enrichment and a confidential relation-
ship.149 A confidential relationship exists whenever one person places his
trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of another.150 Confidential
relationships exist between oil companies and landmen.151 Unjust enrich-
ment is applied in the absence of an express or implied contract to prevent
one person from being unjustly enriched at the expense of another.152 To
prove unjust enrichment the injured party must show an absence of remedy
provided by law.153 If the parties have voluntarily entered into an express
written contract, unjust enrichment is not the remedy.15 4
"In order for a constructive trust to be declared there must exist not
only a fiduciary relationship, but also the violation of the duty of loyalty
and honesty which the relationship demands." 55 Other courts have ex-
plained that:
[w]hile a confidential or fiduciary relationship does not in itself
give rise to a constructive trust, an abuse of confidence rendering
the acquisition or retention of property by one person uncon-
scionable against another suffices generally to ground equitable
relief in the form of the declaration and enforcement of a
constructive trust, and the courts are careful not to limit the rule or
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 819; see also N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 47-25-01 (2003) (providing for North
Dakota's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450-417.467
(West 2001) (providing for Missouri's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
148. Spagnolia v. Monasky, 2003 ND 65, 15, 660 NW.2d 223, 229.
149. Id. at5 16.
150. Id. (quoting Schroeder v. Buchholz, 2001 ND 36, 1 8,622 N.W.2d 202, 206).
151. Chisholm v. W. Reserves Oil Co., 655 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1981).
152. Spagnolia, 16, 660 N.W.2d at 229 (quoting Apache Corp. v. MDU Resources Group,
Inc., 1999 ND 247, J 13, 603 N.W.2d 891).
153. Id. (quoting Schroeder, 2001 ND 36, at 5 15).
154. Id. (quoting JN Exploration & Prod. v. Western Gas Res. Inc., 153 F.3d 906, 910 (8th
Cir. 1998)).
155. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768, 775 (10th Cir. 1982).
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the scope of its application by a narrow definition of fiduciary or
confidential relationships protected by it. 156
Under North Dakota's statutory scheme, the courts may impose a
constructive trust in order to prevent unjust enrichment when title to
property is acquired in violation of a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship.157 "The abuse of a confidential relationship by acquiring property
through the employment of knowledge or interest obtained in such relation-
ship constitutes a sufficient basis for equitable relief in the form of ... a
constructive trust in respect of such property and in favor of the person
wronged." 1
58
The existence of a constructive trust may be established by parol
evidence that is clear, convincing, and satisfactory. 59 The party seeking to
impose the constructive trust has the burden of proving the existence of the
trust by clear and convincing evidence. 60
For a constructive trust to exist, not only must there be a fiduciary
relationship but also the violation of a duty of loyalty and honesty.161 The
duty of loyalty is generally confined to instances of direct competition,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and other acts against the interest of the
employer. 62 Indirect competition with the employer is only actionable if
the employee gives the competitor substantial assistance in competing
against the employer. 63 However, a broad cause of action would not only
give the employer more protection than it needed and create an unfair
advantage, but it would also inhibit the employee's marketability. 64
156. Wildfang-Miller Motors, Inc. v. Miller, 186 N.W.2d 581, 584 (N.D. 1971) (quoting 54
AM. JUR. Trusts § 225 (1945)).
157. Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 114 (N.D. 1985). The statutory scheme
the court refers to in this case is N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-06(2) (2003), which provides:
An implied trust arises in the following cases:
(2) One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation
of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless the person has some other and better right
thereto, an implied trustee of the thing gained for the benefit of the person who would
otherwise have had it.
Id.
158. Wildfang-Miller, 186 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting 54 AM. JUR. Trusts § 226 (1945)).
159. Id. at 585.
160. Napoleon Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Rohrich, 406 N.W.2d 346, 356 (N.D. 1987).
161. Tenneco Oil Co., 696 F.2d at 775.
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C. INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS ADVANTAGE
Employers may also sue under the theory of unlawful interference with
prospective business advantage.165 This cause of action may claim either
wrongful interference or negligent interference. 166
1. Wrongful Interference with Prospective Business Advantage
North Dakota has recently joined the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States who recognize a tort for wrongful interference with a
prospective business advantage.167 In order to prevail on this tort claim, a
plaintiff must prove:
(1) The existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy;
(2) Knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy;
(3) An independently tortious or otherwise unlawful act of
interference by the interferer;
(4) Proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and
(5) Actual damages to the party whose relationship or expectancy
was disrupted. 168
The court is willing to recognize opinions from other jurisdictions over the
precise nature of "wrongful" conduct. 169
2. Negligent Interference with Prospective Business Advantage
An employer may also file a claim of negligent interference with
prospective business advantage.170 The employer must prove and plead six
factors to establish a prima facie case.171 First, the business relationship
must have been with a party independent of the employer.172 Second, the
165. See, e.g., Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 2001 ND 116, T 42, 628
N.W.2d 707, 719 (holding that, in order to recover under this tort, the plaintiff must prove the
defendant's conduct was unlawful).
166. See, e.g., Mr. G's Turtle Mountain Lodge, Inc. v. Roland Twp., 2002 ND 140, 51 25, 651
N.W.2d 625, 632 (holding that North Dakota recognizes the existence of an action for this tort).
167. Trade 'N Post, L.L.C., 2001 ND 116, 5J 35, 628 N.W.2d at 717.
168. Id. at 51 36 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 37.
170. See id. at 55 35-36 (recognizing the tort of unlawful interference with business).
171. Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action for Interference with Prospective Business Advantage,
16 CAUSES OF AcTION 569, 580-81. But see Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Americas,
Inc. 2001 ND 116. 51 41, 628 N.W.2d 707, 719 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring) (stating that the
law may not allow recovery for tortious interference with prospective business relations because
the law already recognizes the right to compete for future business).
172. Krohn, supra note 171, at 580.
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employer reasonably expected some economic gain from the relationship.17 3
Third, the employee engaged in conduct that had an adverse effect on the
relationship. 7 4 Fourth, the employee intended to harm the relationship.17 5
Fifth, the employee's conduct was the proximate cause of the harm to the
relationship. 7 6 And finally, the employer suffered a damage or loss as a
result of the employee's interference with the relationship. 177
D. CASE WHERE No REMEDY PERMITTED
An example of a case where an employee was not found to use
confidential information of his employer is Amerada Petroleum Corp. v.
Burline.7 8 This case involved an action by a mining company against one
of their employees.179 The mining company (Amerada) sought a court
order to make their employee (Burline) convey to Amerada the mineral
interests Burline had acquired while working for Amerada.180
Amerada became interested in acquiring certain mineral interests in the
Williston Basin of North Dakota.181 Burline was a full-time employee of
Amerada, and while he was assistant superintendent for production, he
acquired five royalty interests in Williams and Mountrail Counties. 8 2
Amerada had an adopted rule which prohibited its officers and employees
from purchasing or dealing in oil or gas mineral interests, either directly or
indirectly. 83 Burline was aware of this rule; he did not agree to the rule
either orally or in writing, but the court did find that he acquiesced to it.184
Burline was not to buy leases or mineral interests for Amerada, nor to
compile geological or geophysical information.18 5 Burline's duties included
supervising the drilling of wells, the testing and completion of wells, the
producing of oil and gas from those wells, and providing services and






178. 231 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1956).
179. Amerada, 231 F.2d at 863.
180. Id. at 863.





185. Id. at 865.
186. Id. at 864-65.
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with an ownership map which showed Amerada's oil and gas leases.187
These same maps were also readily available to the general public. 8 8 The
court did not find a fiduciary relationship between Burline and Amerada.189
The reason, the court stated, was because Burline's job with Amerada did
not allow him access to Amerada's oil and gas mineral interests. 190
Burline's purchase of the mineral interests did not amount to using
confidential information belonging to Amerada because the information he
used was available to the public.191
VIII. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PETROLEUM LANDMEN
AND ITS INFLUENCE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
The American Association of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL) "intends to
enhance the professional stature of landmen with the public."192 The goals
of the AAPL include promoting "professional development" and
"representation in various oil and gas industry-related organizations and
associations."1 93 The AAPL's mission "is to promote the highest standards
of performance for all land professionals, to advance their stature and to
encourage sound stewardship of energy and mineral resources." 94 One
may become a member of the AAPL by submitting an application to the
AAPL home office. 195 However, in most cases the landman's ability to find
a job does not require that he be a member of the AAPL.196
Each applicant who wishes to become a member of the AAPL and each
landman seeking to be a Certified Professional Landman (CPL) must agree
to abide by the AAPL's code of ethics.19 7 Every member of the AAPL
must conduct his business in accordance with the Standards of Practice,
which coincide with the Code of Ethics.198 But this presents a problem.
187. Id. at 865.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 866.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-10.
193. Id.
194. American Association of Petroleum Landmen, Our Mission, at http://www.landman.org
/aboutmission.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
195. American Association of Petroleum Landmen, AAPL Membership Application,
http://www.landman.org/joinApp.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). The AAPL provides a
downloadable application at this website.
196. Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-9.
197. Id. at 19-7 to 19-8. See also American Association of Petroleum Landmen, AAPL Code
of Ethics and Standards of Practice, http://www.landman.org/joinCode.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2005) (outlining the basis of conduct and principles of AAPL membership).
198. American Association of Petroleum Landmen, AAPL Standards of Practice,
http://www.landman.org/joinCode.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
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Since a landman does not have to be a member of the AAPL to legally
practice his profession, the AAPL ethics and standards may not apply to
every landman.199 Some jurisdictions may even consider the standards to
be hearsay when an oil company tries to enforce the AAPL-based guide-
lines in court.200
The argument can be made that perhaps the AAPL standards should be
admissible as evidence when a landman violates a covenant not to compete
because they are recognized as the industry standards.201 However, the fact
remains that the AAPL standard is not the absolute standard.202 There may
be differing opinions between the AAPL standards, the employer, and the
landman as to the restriction of a "reasonable" time for non-competition. 203
As such, a court should not rely on the AAPL standards to judge the
practices of a non-AAPL landman.
IX. CONCLUSION
The oil and gas industry in North Dakota suffers from a limited number
of counties in which oil production occurs. 204 Because of this, a non-com-
petition clause that restricts a landman from working in a particular county
is much more of a restriction of trade than a non-competition clause that
restricts any other occupation in North Dakota. "The training and back-
ground of ... landmen is very specialized, and to exclude such profes-
sionals from working in a specific geographic area or with respect to their
acquired knowledge may very well prohibit such employees from
exercising their trade." 205
There are varying opinions as to what a reasonable time is for the
restriction of a non-competition agreement. 206 The AAPL suggests a non-
competition period of twelve months.207 One important factor remains: the
199. See Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-8 to 19-9 (stating there have been instances where
courts have refused to enforce standards against nonmembers, but it is still a developing area of
the law).
200. Id. at 19-11.
201. Id. at 19-10 to 19-11.
202. Id.
203. See Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-26 (stating that time restrictions in the oil and gas
industry are generally between three months and three years).
204. NDIC Oil and Gas Division, North Dakota Drilling and Production Statistics,
http://www.oilgas.nd.gov/stats/statistics.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). Generally these counties
are Adams, Billings, Bottineau, Bowman, Burke, Divide, Dunn, Golden Valley, Hettinger,
McKenzie, Mountrail, Renville, Slope, Stark, and Williams. Monthly county production charts
(excluding Adams and Slope) are available. Id.
205. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-26.
206. See Williams, supra note 1, at 445. See also Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-26.
207. App. A, infra, pp. 50, 52, at JT 5, 11.
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restriction may only be long enough to protect the oil company's legitimate
interest and no longer than necessary. 208 The oil company may believe its
information is protected from being disclosed to a competitor by a former
employee, but not all the information the oil company seeks to protect will
be protected by the courts. 209
The landman must also be able to make a living. 210 Although the
AAPL standards are the standards in the oil industry, they should not apply
to a landman who is not a member of the American Association of
Petroleum Landmen. 211 When an oil company wants to file suit against a
landman who is a member of the AAPL, those standards should apply and
the oil company should be allowed to use those standards as evidence
against the landman. 212 However, when the oil company wants to file suit
against a landman who is not a member, the AAPL standards should not
apply because they may be considered hearsay by many jurisdictions. 213
Each party's idea of a "reasonable time" for non-competition may be
different, and the result of not specifying this time will certainly lead to
litigation between the oil company and the landman. As a safe practice for
both parties to avoid confusion and legal action in the future, any contract
signed between the two parties should be in writing and specify the non-
competition period.
Lee Grossman
208. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-13.
209. See Unikel, supra note 113, at 844 (discussing the need of companies to protect
confidential information).
210. Hendrix, supra note 2, at 21-26.
211. Knutson, supra note 10, at 19-11.
212. Id. at 19-10.





THIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is made
and entered into on this __ day of , 2004, by and
between , whose address is
, and
whose address is ("Disclosing Party").
In connection with Recipient's consideration of a possible transaction
affecting certain oil and gas properties described in "Exhibit A" attached
hereto (the "Properties"), Disclosing Party is prepared to make available to
Recipient and its directors, officers, employees, agents or advisors (in-
cluding, without limitation, attorneys, accountants, consultants, bankers,
and financial advisors, all of which are hereinafter called collectively
"Representatives"), on a nonexclusive basis certain information concerning
the Properties.
To maintain confidentiality and restrictions on use of the information
provided by Disclosing Party to Recipient and its Representatives and any
derivative information prepared by or for Recipient or Recipient's Repre-
sentatives based on that information, and in consideration of Disclosing
Party making the same available, both parties agree to the following terms
and conditions:
I. Recipient agrees to treat any information concerning the Properties
(whether prepared by Disclosing Party, its employees, agents or
otherwise and irrespective of the form of communication) which is
made available to Recipient or to Recipient's Representatives by
or on behalf of Disclosing Party, and any derivative information
prepared by or for Recipient or Recipient's Representatives based
on that information (herein collectively referred to as the
"Evaluation Material") in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement and to take or abstain from taking certain other actions
hereinafter set forth.
214. This Confidentiality Agreement is approved by the American Association of Petroleum
Landmen. It was received by the author from L. Keith Vincent, RPL. Mr. Vincent is the Forms
Chairman of the American Association of Petroleum Landmen.
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2. The term "Evaluation Material" shall be deemed to include (i) any
geological, engineering, geophysical or seismic data, descriptions,
maps, models, interpretations, evaluations and reports regarding
the Properties provided to Recipient or its Representatives under
this Agreement; (ii) any commercial, contractual financial or other
related or unrelated information regarding the Properties provided
to Recipient or its Representatives under this Agreement; and (iii)
all notes, analyses, compilations, studies, interpretations or other
documents prepared by or for Recipient or Recipient's Repre-
sentatives which contain, reflect or are based upon, in whole or in
part the information furnished to Recipient or its Representatives
under this Agreement. The term Evaluation Material includes
information in whatever form it may exist, whether oral, written,
graphic, or electronic. The term "Evaluation Material" does not
include information which (i) is or becomes generally available to
the public other than as a result of a disclosure by Recipient's
Representatives, (ii) was within Recipient's possession prior to its
being made available to Recipient by or on behalf of Disclosing
Party pursuant hereto, provided that the source of such information
was not known by Recipient to be bound by a confidentiality
agreement with, or other contractual, legal or fiduciary obligation
of confidentiality to Disclosing Party or any other party with
respect to such information, or (iii) becomes available to Recipient
on a non-confidential basis from a source other than Disclosing
Party or any of its Representatives, provided that such source is
not bound by a confidentiality agreement with, or other contrac-
tual, legal or fiduciary obligation of confidentiality to, Disclosing
Party or any other party with respect to such information.
3. Recipient hereby agrees that (i) Recipient and its Representatives
shall use the Evaluation Material solely for the purpose of
evaluating a possible acquisition of the Properties from Disclosing
Party (ii) the Evaluation Material will be kept strictly confidential,
and (iii) Recipient and its Representatives will not disclose any of
the Evaluation Material in any manner whatsoever; provided, how-
ever, that Recipient may make any disclosure of the Evaluation
Material to which Disclosing Party gives its prior written consent,
and any of the Evaluation Material may be disclosed to Recipient's
Representatives who need to know such information for the
purpose of evaluating a possible acquisition of the Properties and
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who agree to keep such information confidential in accordance
with the terms of this Agreement. In addition, if Recipient is
required to disclose such information by a court of law or other
governmental entity having jurisdiction, Recipient will timely
notify Disclosing Party so that Disclosing Party may take action to
obtain the protection necessary to preserve the confidentiality of
the Evaluation Material.
4. Recipient agrees that, without the prior written consent of
Disclosing Party, Recipient and its Representatives will not dis-
close to any person the fact that the Evaluation Material has been
made available to Recipient, that discussions or negotiations are
taking place concerning a possible acquisition of the Properties or
any of the terms, conditions or other facts with respect thereto,
including the status thereof. The term "person" as used in this
Agreement shall be broadly interpreted to include the media and
any corporation, partnership, group, individual or other entity.
5. In order to protect Disclosing Party's proprietary interest in the
Evaluation Material referenced herein, if within one (1) year of the
date of this Agreement, Recipient acquires either (i) any interest in
a portion of any of the acreage within the AMI boundary, as
shown in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, or (ii) a right to acquire any
interest in a portion of any of the acreage within said AMI
boundary, then Disclosing Party shall have the right, but not the
obligation, to acquire from Recipient, under the same exact terms
and conditions, the acquired interest or right at Disclosing Party'§
election, as follows:
An undivided 100% working interest percentage share, or a
lesser undivided working interest percentage share at
Disclosing Party's election, of the acquired interest or right; in
the event Disclosing Party exercises the above right, it agrees
to bear such percentage share of the cost or other consid-
eration granted in connection with such acquired interest or
right (including but not limited to the cost and risk of drilling,
if drilling is necessary to earn the interest sought to be
acquired).
Recipient shall notify Disclosing Party, in writing, within thirty
(30) days of such acquisition (said notice to include all costs
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and/or obligations relative to said acquisition) and Disclosing
Party shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice to
advise Recipient of its election. Disclosing Party shall assume the
costs and/or obligations attributable to the acquired interest.
Within thirty (30) days after Disclosing Party (i) remits full
payment for such proportionate costs, if any, and (ii) commits, in
writing, to bear the disclosed obligations, if any, attributable to the
acquired interests, Recipient shall deliver an assignment to
Disclosing Party conveying the interest which Disclosing Party has
elected to acquire.
6. If Recipient decides that it does not wish to make a proposal for
the acquisition of the Properties, Recipient will promptly inform
Disclosing Party of that decision. In the event of such a decision
or a request from Disclosing Party, all Evaluation Material in the
possession of Recipient or its Representatives shall be returned,
and no copy thereof shall be retained. Notwithstanding the destruc-
tion of the Evaluation Material, Recipient and its Representatives
will continue to be bound by Recipient's obligation of confi-
dentiality and other obligations hereunder.
7. Recipient acknowledges that Disclosing Party, its directors, offi-
cers, employees and agents do not make any representation or
warranty, express or implied, as to the quality, accuracy, complete-
ness or materiality of the Evaluation Material, including without
limitation any representation or warranty with respect to any
description of the Properties, the quality or quantity of potential or
existing hydrocarbon reserves, if any, production rates, drilling,
rework or recompletion opportunities or locations, decline rates, or
potential for production of hydrocarbon from the Properties.
Recipient agrees that neither Disclosing Party nor any of its
Representatives shall have any liability to Recipient or to any of its
Representatives relating to or resulting from the use of the
Evaluation Material. Any and all of the Evaluation Material
furnished by Disclosing Party is provided as a convenience only
and any reliance on or use of same is at Recipient's sole risk, and
Recipient hereby releases Disclosing Party from all claims arising
out of any such reliance.
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8. Recipient agrees that unless and until a definitive agreement
regarding the acquisition of the Properties has been executed,
neither Disclosing Party nor Recipient will be under any legal
obligation of any kind whatsoever with respect to such a trans-
action by virtue of this Agreement except for the matters specif-
ically agreed to herein. Recipient further acknowledges and agrees
that Disclosing Party reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to
reject any and all proposals made by Recipient or any of its Repre-
sentatives with regard to a transaction involving the Properties,
and to terminate discussions and negotiations with Recipient at
any time without any liability to Recipient. Each party shall bear
its own evaluation, consultant, legal, and other expenses associated
with any evaluation, discussion, and negotiations concerning the
Properties.
9. This Agreement is personal to Recipient and may not be assigned
without Disclosing Party's prior written consent, which may be
withheld for any reason including convenience. Disclosing Party
reserves the right to assign all of its rights, powers and privileges
under this Agreement, including without limitation, the right to
enforce all of the terms of this Agreement. In addition, this
Agreement shall inure to the benefit of all parents, affiliates, and
subsidiaries of Disclosing Party and of all partnerships of which
Disclosing Party is the managing general partner.
10. THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND
CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA WITHOUT REGARD TO CONFLICTS
OF LAW PRINCIPLES OTHERWISE APPLICABLE TO SUCH
DETERMINATIONS.
11. The confidentiality obligations of this Agreement with respect to
the Evaluation Material shall expire and are of no further force and
effect one (1) year from the date first written above. However, all
other provisions of this Agreement, including those pertaining to
use of the Evaluation Material, shall continue in full force and
effect.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to
be executed by their duly authorized officers as of the date first written
above.
ENERGY PARTNERS, LTD.
